Reforging Ockham’s Razor: an enquiry into the ontology of parsimony arguments
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
Museums for the Planet: Critical Realist Philosophy and the Possibility of an Eco-decolonial Museology
- Authors: Jeffery, Thomas Carnegie
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Museums Management , Critical realism , Ontology , Decolonization , Organizational change , Social ecology , Eco-decolonial
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192692 , vital:45251 , 10.21504/10962/192692
- Description: This study introduces dialectical critical realism into museology as a philosophical underlabourer for the development of new theoretical potentials for the transformation of museum practice. The idea of the museum is in a moment of fluidity evident in emergent decolonial and ecological perspectives and in the International Council of Museum’s process of redefinition of the museum. The potential to reimagine the museum lacks a coherent philosophical and theoretical foundation. The persistence of museological dualism separates the social from the ecological and absents the emergence of relational modes of thinking and practice. This study conceives an ecological-decolonial or eco-decolonial mode of museology that is disruptive of dualism and generative of relationality, and is thus generative of agency for deeper, more effective and enduring social-ecological justice. The core of this thesis is the development of the eco-decolonial mode of museology through the DCR onto-axiological chain or ‘MELD’ schema. At 1M a depth ontological analysis augmented by interviews with key informants establishes a dialectic of society and ecology in the museological context. 1M surfaces capitalism and the implicit neoliberal ontology of museology as deep causal mechanisms of the 2E persistence of museological human-nature dualism. The paradox of ‘emancipatory neoliberalism’ is a policy-practice contradiction that absents potentials for transformation of the museum and that is held in place by the grounding ontological activity of museology, collection. The 2E perspective on absences enables the emergence of new transformative pathways towards the 3L vision of the eco-decolonial mode of museology as a (4D) new way of thinking and working to resolve neoliberal restrictions. The fundamental 4D change envisioned for museum philosophy, theory and practice is an ontological transformation from traditionalist human-nature dualism to a progressive human-nature dialectic. A case study considers instances where museum workers exercised the agency to expand practice in this way. Future work using the expansive learning methodology of Change Laboratories will develop and implement the potentials generated by the onto-axiological chain for the eco-decolonial mode to bring real change to traditional, dualist museum practice, in order to ensure the relevance and the agency of the museum as a social structure in and for a changing world. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Education, Education, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Jeffery, Thomas Carnegie
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Museums Management , Critical realism , Ontology , Decolonization , Organizational change , Social ecology , Eco-decolonial
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192692 , vital:45251 , 10.21504/10962/192692
- Description: This study introduces dialectical critical realism into museology as a philosophical underlabourer for the development of new theoretical potentials for the transformation of museum practice. The idea of the museum is in a moment of fluidity evident in emergent decolonial and ecological perspectives and in the International Council of Museum’s process of redefinition of the museum. The potential to reimagine the museum lacks a coherent philosophical and theoretical foundation. The persistence of museological dualism separates the social from the ecological and absents the emergence of relational modes of thinking and practice. This study conceives an ecological-decolonial or eco-decolonial mode of museology that is disruptive of dualism and generative of relationality, and is thus generative of agency for deeper, more effective and enduring social-ecological justice. The core of this thesis is the development of the eco-decolonial mode of museology through the DCR onto-axiological chain or ‘MELD’ schema. At 1M a depth ontological analysis augmented by interviews with key informants establishes a dialectic of society and ecology in the museological context. 1M surfaces capitalism and the implicit neoliberal ontology of museology as deep causal mechanisms of the 2E persistence of museological human-nature dualism. The paradox of ‘emancipatory neoliberalism’ is a policy-practice contradiction that absents potentials for transformation of the museum and that is held in place by the grounding ontological activity of museology, collection. The 2E perspective on absences enables the emergence of new transformative pathways towards the 3L vision of the eco-decolonial mode of museology as a (4D) new way of thinking and working to resolve neoliberal restrictions. The fundamental 4D change envisioned for museum philosophy, theory and practice is an ontological transformation from traditionalist human-nature dualism to a progressive human-nature dialectic. A case study considers instances where museum workers exercised the agency to expand practice in this way. Future work using the expansive learning methodology of Change Laboratories will develop and implement the potentials generated by the onto-axiological chain for the eco-decolonial mode to bring real change to traditional, dualist museum practice, in order to ensure the relevance and the agency of the museum as a social structure in and for a changing world. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Education, Education, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Zusammenhangen and logical atomism in Wittgenstein's tractatus
- Authors: Dyer, Clive
- Date: 1982 , 2013-03-19
- Subjects: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2734 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005929 , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Description: Introduction: The argument presented in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's answer to the question - as to how one. proposition can be generated out of another - can show a way in which the reconciliation between logical atomism and Zusammenhangen becomes obvious. In the Preliminaries an exposition of logical atomism and the Zusammenhangen thesis is given. The way in which the problem appears is then briefly exposed. The way towards a solution begins with the elucidation of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the truthfunctional analysis of a proposition. The problem is clarified in the question which now arises: i.e., given the truth-functional analysis of a proposition,. how can one proposition be generated out of another? The problem is then shown to vanish in the logical construction of a proposition and of propositions. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1982
- Authors: Dyer, Clive
- Date: 1982 , 2013-03-19
- Subjects: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2734 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005929 , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Description: Introduction: The argument presented in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's answer to the question - as to how one. proposition can be generated out of another - can show a way in which the reconciliation between logical atomism and Zusammenhangen becomes obvious. In the Preliminaries an exposition of logical atomism and the Zusammenhangen thesis is given. The way in which the problem appears is then briefly exposed. The way towards a solution begins with the elucidation of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the truthfunctional analysis of a proposition. The problem is clarified in the question which now arises: i.e., given the truth-functional analysis of a proposition,. how can one proposition be generated out of another? The problem is then shown to vanish in the logical construction of a proposition and of propositions. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1982
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